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encyclopaedia contains knowledge. If there is
an agreed interpretation of the words in the
book, the interpretation should entail that the
words express things that are true and justifi-
able. But the encyclopaedia has no psycho-
logical states at all, and doesn't believe or
disbelieve its contents. Beliefs or other psycho-
logical states need not come into it.
Why does Plato ignore these types of knowledge?
The simple response is that he was chiefly con-
cerned with establishing a distinction between
true belief and knowledge, because his diagnosis
of the ills of Athens had led him to worry that
people were relying complacently on their beliefs
about virtue and not seeking knowledge. Those
whose beliefs about virtue happened to be true
could teach virtue to the next generation; true
beliefs don't lead one astray. However, how could
it be known whose beliefs were true and whose
false? Socrates showed that many of the most
confident thinkers were mistaken. For Plato, it all
came down to beliefs; other kinds of knowledge,
if such there be, weren't the point.
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position without advancing any positive thesis
yourself.
At the basic level, everyone has wondered how
they know they are not currently dreaming. Rene
Descartes (1596-1650) famously tried to build
philosophy on unassailable foundations by con-
ducting a fictitious argument with a very bloody-
minded sceptic who doubted everything; the
attempt, sadly, foundered on the fact that most
observers agree that the sceptic rather won the
day. Indeed - I blush - even I once managed to
prove, on the basis of some fairly innocuous
premises, that everybody was dreaming all of the
time!
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It made sense for Plato to aim his arguments at
sceptics, as they were prominent in Athenian
political life at the time. It is less so for modern-
day epistemologists, for no one occupies the scep-
tical position, except within academia. There are
other purposes for epistemology, and other
people who are interested in the arguments.
Given the changing intellectual background,
surely it would be better to reject scepticism as a
type of philosophical disease (with Wittgenstein -
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was large, the cost of reproducing it huge. Bound
books reduced that space, and, once printing
allowed the production of millions of volumes,
libraries could hold them. Now, a floppy disk
will hold a decent-sized book, a CD-ROM even
more, and a laptop computer still more. More
books are being written, and more periodicals
published. More photographs are being taken,
X-rays shot, videos made.
And the cost of storing all this material has
shrunk rapidly. The new British Library in
London, designed to hold 12 million volumes,
cost £500 million. But magnetic storage is a
different matter. A byte is the amount of storage
required for a single character, so a book is 1
million bytes, or a megabyte. A gigabyte is the
standard measure of data, a thousand megabytes
(i.e., a thousand books). And the cost of storing a
gigabyte of data magnetically was not much
more than £5 in late 2000, and will be well under
£1 by 2005, when the virtual equivalent of the
British Library will cost a mere £12,000.
The opportunities this new technology has
brought are already being exploited. To begin
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amount of information for people to have access
to instantaneously. And it is this that has made
the Internet the engine for a colossal shift in
human capabilities.
Some commentators have refused to see the
Internet as a significant enough change in tech-
nology to make it philosophically interesting;
others have worried that the Internet will only
bring problems. It is certainly important not to
overstate the case for the defence, particularly in
a world where half the population has never
made a telephone call.
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explosion of available content could be as signifi-
cant to human development as the invention of
movable type. As we have seen in this section, the
actual technological developments aren't earth-
shattering; a few transfer protocols here, a
markup language there, and a system for manag-
ing changes and addresses. But, as with printing,
a number of small changes, taken cumulatively,
could have major effects.
2
1
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not have to stop making X-type widgets; neither
does it have to employ a new expert. Smith's
expertise is still available to engineers 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, as long as they have a
laptop and a phone line. The Intranet is still run-
ning the Webpages about X-type widgets, and
their navigation structure causes the user to go
through the same problem-solving process that
Smith would have gone through.
Now, earlier on, we used the phrase, 'WM
contains knowledge about X', loosely, meta-
phorically, knowing there was an easy rational-
isation of it, since Smith was an employee of WM.
Now, however, we cannot be so loose, because
Smith has left. No person within the organisation
has Smith's problem-solving capability. The people
who drew up the Webpages were most likely
independent consultants who have long since
gone; let us further suppose that nothing has ever
gone wrong with an X-type widget, and that
therefore no one in WM has ever even read the
Webpages. No one in WM has any justified true
beliefs about problems with X-type widgets.
And yet, it is very intuitive to say that WM still
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How might information contrast with know-
ledge? Let's try to suggest a distinction by the use
of an example.
For several years now, supermarkets have
recorded the details of each purchase made in
them by using electronic tills, each of which
updates a central database. As a result, super-
markets with nationwide chains of branches have
enormous masses of data about billions and bil-
lions of purchases. These data are clearly infor-
mation, as the big databanks will have some
interpretation which enables the reader to work
out which purchase is referred to, what was pur-
chased, how much it cost, etc.
Is this vast quantity of information useful in
itself? Hardly. No human reader could scan the
printouts in a lifetime, even if he wanted to, still
less draw any conclusions from it. If such stuff is
knowledge, then there doesn't seem to be much
point in having it.
However, one can imagine converting such
data-sets into knowledge (this would be a know-
ledge acquisition process, in the terms of the pre-
vious section). Using special computer programs
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will make a big difference to the profits of
commercial firms and to the success of non-
commercial organisations.
So, let's recap our characterisation. Data are
sets of symbols, while information is meaningful
data. Knowledge is that information which is
usable for the purposes of supporting or suggest-
ing action; it is a stepping stone to some end.
Data, information, knowledge: they sit as a
pyramid. Perhaps, with tongue only slightly in
cheek, one might even imagine wisdom sitting at
the apex, characterised as the ability to select
appropriate important goals for one's useful
knowledge to be applied to.
Scepticism is out of place here. The super-
market of our example wants help with the six
challenges of knowledge management. A proof
that, say, the external world exists and that the
five senses can deliver knowledge, reassuring and
philosophically interesting though this may be, is
not going to be of any help in deciding how many
tins of beans to send to Wiltshire. The manager
who doubted the existence of Wiltshire would be
given a long rest, not a proof.
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The Semantic Web
This characterisation of knowledge - as usable
information - has been generally adopted by
those researching knowledge management in the
Internet age. By creating technologies that help in
the handling of information, more information
becomes usable, and therefore by our criteria,
turns from information to knowledge. Hence
technologists, such as W3C, or the AKT project
mentioned above, who have taken the 'usable
information' characterisation on board, can pro-
duce real systems and tools that actively help
organisations and individuals become more effec-
tive by controlling the information they have
access to. Information overload is alleviated, not
by reducing the amount of information available,
but by increasing the amount of knowledge.
W3C has developed a language for writing
Webpages to supersede HTML, a language called
XML (extensible Markup Language - actually a
language for representing other languages, but
let's steer clear of details!). XML allows designers
to place 'tags' in Webpages that are invisible to
the reader (i.e., they don't appear in the browser
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problematic. Even leaving aside some fiendish
thought experiments developed by Edmund
Gettier in the 1960s that cast doubt on any rea-
sonable notion of justification as being sufficient
- experiments which no one has satisfactorily
explained away - there has never been any con-
sensus about what justification would do.
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Even under the 'usable information' characteri-
sation, some sort of justification of the knowl-
edge's efficacy would be required. The quality of
a stock-control system will affect a firm's profits
and its employees' jobs; the quality of a heart-
monitoring system will affect a person's chances
of life. In such sensitive contexts, the knowledge
that has been put into the computer had better be
reliable.
But there is a difference in the role of the
justification under the two characterisations. In
the JTB tradition, the justification is central - a
true belief is knowledge if and only if the justifi-
cation of the belief is adequate. Philosophers have
suggested a number of possible types of justifica-
tion. Examples include: the knowledge can be
derived from some privileged, deep foundational
53KNOWLEDGE: BELIEF?
less likely to be borne out by events. They are not
deep-down assumptions but clever shortcuts
developed professionally as part of the execution
of expertise.
Each of these types of information, I am claim-
ing, should be seen as knowledge, in that they are
all extremely usable for effective action. Every-
one uses know-how and default reasoning; exp-
erts rely on heuristics. Can an epistemologist
possibly ignore these?
Knowledge: Belief?
Perhaps the most radical departure I am propos-
ing is that knowledge need not be a psychological
state. There are philosophers who are prepared
to take a smaller step, that knowledge isn't a
belief; for example, Timothy Williamson (see
Note 13). The requirements of the Internet age,
however, are stronger than that. Knowledge does
not have to be anything psychological at all.
As we have seen from the widget example earlier,
from the point of view of an organisation and its
need to manage its knowledge effectively to get
the maximum benefit from it, there is no essential
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Conclusion: Twenty-first Century
Alchemy?
To review our analysis, we have examined the
JTB tradition in the context of the knowledge
economy, and found it wanting. An epistemology
suitable for this technological climate can be fairly
relaxed about justification; knowledge should be
justified, but different types of knowledge will
need different types of justification. The require-
ment for truth needs to be replaced with a
requirement for effectiveness (which will, one
imagines, coincide with truth to a large extent).
The analysis of knowledge as a belief, or as any
psychological state, seriously undermines the JTB
tradition in the modern context.
The proposal is that the JTB characterisation
be replaced by the characterisation of knowledge
as 'usable information'. We have illustrated the
ideas here, although of course what has trans-
pired in this book falls a long way short of a tight
definition. No doubt, giving such a definition to
the new conception of knowledge will be as diffi-
cult as the task of refining the JTB conception has
been. However, technologists such as W3C and
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would attempt to show that some of our 'false'
knowledge is really true when you understand it
properly, or that what seem to be non-beliefs are
actually reducible to psychological states in some
way.
Though it takes our concerns more seriously,
this isn't a great improvement on the heroic
response. Its underlying premise, that epistemo-
logy is more or less okay once we realise that
we have misconstrued the significance of our
'counter-examples', fails to take into account the
essential need for experts to reach out to their
constituency, rather than the other way round.
An expert, whether an epistemologist, physicist,
astrologer or car mechanic, must tailor his or her
expertise to the people who need it, not vice
versa. It is not for the busy corporate executive or
NGO director to try to fit their knowledge prob-
lems into the JTB framework; rather, it is the job
of the epistemologist to show how the JTB theory
applies to the problems as they appear on the
ground. Any devious analysis is, in a sense, the
'hidden wiring' that the user of the theory must
not be bothered with.
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But, if we are to face up to the facts, the
Internet and related technological innovations
have changed the way knowledge is viewed. In
Plato's day, when the JTB tradition began,
knowledge was a personal accomplishment, and
so it continued pretty well up to the present. But
there has been a gradual change, so that know-
ledge is now also a commodity, to be bought,
sold, managed, invested in, leveraged, deployed,
etc. We need an epistemology appropriate for this
context, and the JTB tradition isn't it.
Of course, I have been describing a world of new
technology and buzzwords that may be a passing
fad. It may be thought that if JTB sits tight and
ignores present circumstances, it will regain its
applicability. This is certainly possible, but doesn't
detract from the need for an information-based
epistemology now, and the mere fact that the
knowledge economy may disappear next week
shows neither that it has no pressing epistemo-
logical requirements, nor that any epistemological
discoveries made in that context will have no
wider interest or application.
In short, there is a need for an epistemology
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tailored for a specific audience which the JTB
tradition has failed to deliver, and it is in danger
of missing a real opportunity to move from
academe into a constructive engagement with the
world of commerce and technology.
It may be that epistemology now is in the posi-
tion of the philosophy of matter in the late
medieval period. Philosophers had always had
theories of what the world was made of, from the
times of the ancient Greeks to the alchemists, and
these theories came under the heading of 'natural
philosophy'. However, in the seventeenth century,
particularly thanks to Newton, natural philo-
sophy gradually acquired an empirical basis, and
found itself debating, not antiquated thought
experiments about how far you could divide
space or substance, but problems such as the
correct description of the orbits of the planets. It
is certainly not the case that the alchemists made
no contribution to our understanding of matter,
but it cannot be denied that if you want to find
out about what makes up our world, you would
be wiser to ask a physicist or a chemist. Natural
philosophy gradually transmuted into hard science.
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There are resemblances between epistemology
now and natural philosophy then. After millen-
nia of relatively inconclusive debate, there is for
the first time a basis and a requirement for
empirical application of ideas. Some of these
ideas will be of great use in this new world, oth-
ers will turn out to be useless. My guess, and I
can't say I know this, is that the JTB tradition
will turn out to be a dead end - the alchemy of
our day.
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